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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an attorney discipline case. A Hearing Committee ("Committee") of the 
Professional Conduct Board has recommended to this Court that Appellant Jay P. Clark 
("Appellant") be suspended for a period of three years, with 18 months of such suspension 
withheld, followed by a three-year period of probation for professional misconduct. The 
Committee further recommended that Appellant be required to serve the period of withheld 
suspension if he is found to have violated the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("I.R.P.C.") 
during his suspension or probation, that he maintain errors and omissions legal malpractice 
insurance during probation, that he comply with I.B.C.R. 517, that he be required to take and 
pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, that he reimburse the ISB for costs 
associated with this disciplinary proceeding, and that he pay $109.37 in restitution to his former 
client. 
B. Course of Discipline Proceedings 
On August 15, 2005, Mateo Varela filed a grievance against Appellant with the Idaho 
State Bar ("ISB"). (Exhibit 70.) The ISB requested and received formal charge approval from 
the ISB Board of Commissioners and thereafter filed a Complaint against Appellant on May 20, 
2009. (R., Vol. I, pp. 2-15.) Count One of the Complaint related to a separate grievance and was 
resolved prior to hearing. (R., Vol. I, pp. 3-8.) Count Two alleged that during his representation 
of Varela, Appellant violated LR.P.C. 1.2 [Failure to pursue client objectives], I.R.P.C. 1.3 
[Failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness] and I.R.P.c. 1.4 [Failure to reasonably 
Respondent's Brief - 5 
communicate with client]. (R., Vol. I, pp. 9-11.) Count Three alleged that Appellant violated 
LR.P.C. 8.4(c) [Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation]. (R., Vol. I, 
pp. 11-12.) Count Four alleged that Appellant violated LR.P.C. 1.5(b) [Failure to communicate 
basis or rate of fee to client] and 1.16(d) [Failure to refund unearned fees upon termination of 
representation]. (R., Vol. I, pp. 12-13.) Count Five alleged that Appellant violated LR.P.C. 
8.4(d) [Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice]. (R., Vol. I, pp. 13-14.) 
The Committee was approved by Order dated July 6,2009. (R., VoL I, pp. 16-17.) On 
July 22, 2009, Appellant filed an Answer to the Complaint, admitting and denying the factual 
allegations and asserting 19 affirmative defenses. (R., Vol. I, pp. 18-25.) On August 13,2009, 
the Committee conducted a scheduling conference that culminated in the first of four scheduling 
orders. (R., Vol. I, pp. 28-31.) 
On March 10, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint and a Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss. (R., Vol. I, pp. 47-131.) On April 1, 2010, the ISB filed 
Plaintiff's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Filed Under Seal). (R., 
Vol. I, pp. 135-152.) The Committee heard Appellant's Motion to Dismiss on April 8, 2010. 
(R., Supp. Vol., pp. 553-584.) On April 9, 2010, the Committee issued its Order Denying 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (R., Vol. I, pp. 153-155.) 
The parties conducted discovery prior to hearing and, on May 3, 2010, the ISB filed 
Plaintiff's Pre-Hearing Brief. (R., Vol. I, pp. 156-170.) On December 2 and 3, 2010, the 
Committee conducted an evidentiary hearing. (R., Vol. II, pp. 307-489.) During that hearing, the 
parties stipulated to the admission of Exhibits 40-89 and Exhibits L-O into evidence. 
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Following the hearing, the parties prepared and submitted proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation to the Committee. (R., Vol. II, pp. 257-306.) 
On April 7, 2011, the Committee issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation. (R., Vol. II, pp. 490-526.) The Committee found that Appellant violated 
I.R.P .C. 1.2 and 1.3 with respect to Count Two, that he violated I.R.P .C. 1.5(b) and 1.16( d) with 
respect to Count Four, and that he violated I.R.P.C. 8.4(d) with respect to Count Five. (R., Vol. 
II, p. 511.) The Committee did not find that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 8.4(c) with respect to 
Count Three. (R., Vol. II, p. 511.) Based on those findings, the Committee recommended that 
Appellant be suspended from the practice of law in Idaho for a period of three years, with 18 
months of such suspension withheld. (R., Vol. II, p. 522.) The Committee also recommended 
that Appellant be placed on probation for a period of three years following his reinstatement, if 
any, upon specified terms and conditions. (R., Vol. II, pp. 522-524.) The recommended terms of 
probation included that the withheld suspension would be imposed if Appellant was found to 
have violated the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct during his suspension or probation, that 
he maintain errors and omissions legal malpractice insurance during probation, that he comply 
with I.B.C.R. 517, that he be required to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination, that he reimburse the ISB for costs associated with this disciplinary proceeding and 
that he reimburse Varela $109.37. (R., Vol. II, pp. 522-524.) Neither party filed a motion to 
alter or amend those findings, conclusions and recommendation under I.B.C.R. 511(h)(2). 
On April 14, 2011, the ISB filed a Memorandum of Costs. (R., Vol. II, pp. 527-549.) 
On April 27, before the Committee entered a decision on the ISB's Memorandum of 
Costs, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal requesting review by this Court under I.B.C.R. 
511(k). (R., Vol. II, pp. 550-552.) Based on the Notice of Appeal, the Committee believed its 
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jurisdiction to consider the Memorandum of Costs had concluded. The ISB therefore requests 
that this Court's Disciplinary Order reflect $6,031.52 as the costs to be reimbursed by Appellant 
as the Committee recommended in its Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation. (R., Vol. II, p. 524.) 
On May 13,2011, the transcript of the Committee's e~identiary hearing and the record of 
the Professional Conduct Board were filed with this Court. On December 1, 2011, the transcript 
of the Committee's pretrial motion hearing was filed as a supplemental record with this Court. 
c. Statement of Facts 
The Committee's findings of fact are summarized as follows. On May 28, 2005, Mateo 
Varela ("Varela") was cited with driving while under the influence of alcohol. (R., Vol. II, p. 
492; Exhibit 40, p. 9.) At the time of his arrest, Varela was not physically inside the vehicle he 
was accused of driving. (R., Vol. II, p. 492.) According to the Mountain Home Police 
Department incident report, Varela was intoxicated, possessed the keys to the vehicle in question 
and, after initially denying driving the vehicle, later told the officer, "Take me, I drank and drove 
home." (R., Vol. II, p. 492; Exhibit 40, pp. 5-6.) 
Varela failed the field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer test. (R., Vol. II, p. 492; 
Exhibit 40, pp. 5-7.) He was 'served an Idaho Uniform Citation ("Citation"), which referenced 
his refusal to take the breathalyzer test, and a Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary 
Testing ("Notice"). (R., Vol. II, pp. 492-493; Exhibit 40, p. 9; Exhibit 42.) The Notice stated 
that, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002, Varela's driver's license would be suspended based on 
his refusal to submit to an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration. (R., Vol. II, pp. 492-493; 
Exhibit 42.) The Notice also stated that Varela had the "right to submit a written request within 
seven (7) days to the Elmore County magistrate court for a hearing to show cause why [he] 
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refused to submit to or complete evidentiary test and why [his] driver's license should not be 
suspended." (R., Vol. II, pp. 492-493; Exhibit 42.) Because the show cause hearing request was 
to be submitted to the Elmore County magistrate court no later than June 4, 2005, which was a 
Saturday, the hearing request was due by Monday, June 6, 2005. (R., Vol. II, p. 493.) 
On May 31, 2005, prosecutor Phil Miller filed a misdemeanor DUI charge against Varela. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 493.) He also filed the arresting officer's Affidavit of Refusal to Take Alcohol 
Test and Affidavit of Probable Cause for Arrest. (R., Vol. II, p. 493; Exhibits 41 and 43.) 
Also on May 31, 2005, Varela retained Appellant to represent him in the DUI case. (R., 
Vol. II, p. 493.) Varela informed Appellant that he did not want to lose his driver's license and 
therefore wanted to request a show cause hearing before the Elmore County magistrate court. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 493.) 
At hearing in the disciplinary matter, Varela testified that he brought the Citation to his 
May 31, 2005 meeting with Appellant and informed Appellant that he had refused the 
breathalyzer test. (R., Vol. II, p. 319, Tr. p. 47, LL. 1-7; R., Vol. II, p. 320, Tr. p. 49, LL. 3-12.) 
He also testified that Appellant agreed to request a hearing based on the refusal. (R., Vol. II, p. 
320, Tr. p. 49, LL. 1-12.) 
In his October 2005 response to Bar Counsel, Appellant stated that he explained to Varela 
during their May 31, 2005 meeting that the Notice gave Varela seven days to challenge the 
refusal. (Exhibit 76, p. 2.) He stated that he also informed Varela during that meeting that he 
may have sufficient grounds to challenge the refusal based on Varela's statement that he was not 
driving the vehicle at the time of arrest. (Exhibit 76, p. 2.) At hearing, however, Appellant 
testified that he was not aware during the May 31,2005 meeting that Varela's case involved a 
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refusal and stated that such a "critical issue" would have been reflected in his meeting notes. (R., 
Vol. II, p. 357, Tr. p. 200, LL. 16-22.) 
On or around May 31, 2005, Varela paid Appellant a $500 retainer fee. (R., Vol. II, p. 
320, Tr. p. 49, LL. 13-19.) Varela testified that he did not review or sign a fee agreement for 
Appellant's services and understood at the time that the $500 fee included Appellant's 
representation for the show cause hearing on his license suspension and the underlying DUI 
charge. (R., Vol. II, p. 320, Tr. p. 49, LL. 20-25; R., Vol. II, p. 320, Tr. p. 50, LL. 1-4; R., Vol. 
II, p. 331, Tr. p. 96, LL. 10-24; R., Vol. II, p. 332, Tr. p. 97, LL. 11-19; R., Vol. II, p. 334, Tr. p. 
107, LL. 2-5.) 
Appellant testified that Varela signed a fee agreement that stated the $500 retainer fee 
was a nonrefundable payment earned upon receipt. (R., Vol. II, p. 362, Tr. p. 219, LL. 10-15; R., 
Vol. II, p. 362, Tr. p. 220, LL. 5-7; R., Vol. II, p. 409, Tr. p. 283, LL. 5-12.) He also testified that 
his staff prepared all fee agreements for clients. (R., Vol. II, p. 362, Tr. p. 218, LL. 10-19.) 
However, Appellant's former assistant, Erin Rembert, testified that Appellant, not his staff, 
prepared all fee agreements for clients. (R., Vol. II, Tr. p. 402, LL. 17-25; R., Vol. II, Tr. p. 403, 
LL. 1-4.) 
Appellant also testified that Varela's fee agreement would have been included in the file 
his office sent to Varela's substitute counsel, Mitchell Egusquiza. (R., Vol. II, p. 362, Tr. p. 219, 
LL. 3-9; R., Vol. II, p. 409, Tr. p. 283, LL. 17-24.) Mr. Egusquiza testified that the file he 
received from Appellant did not include any fee agreement. (R., Vol. II, p. 440, Tr. p. 407, LL. 
3-12.) No written fee agreement related to Varela's case was offered as an exhibit at hearing. 
On June 3, 2005, Appellant received discovery responses from Mr. Miller. (R., Vol. II, p. 
494; Exhibit 47.) A Notice of Service indicating that the discovery responses were hand-
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delivered to Appellant on June 3, 2005, was filed with the Elmore County magistrate court at 
approximately 3:30 p.m. on June 3, 2005. (R., Vol. II, pp. 494-495; Exhibit 79, p. 3.) 
In his October 2005 response to Bar Counsel, Appellant stated that he informed Varela on 
June 3, 2005, that the magistrate court would not find sufficient grounds for the refusal because 
Varela had admitted to driving while intoxicated and that, if they proceeded to hearing, Varela 
would be required to perjure himself and Appellant would be required to withdraw. (R., Vol. II, 
p. 495; Exhibit 76, p. 3.) At hearing, Appellant testified that he called Varela on June 3, 2005, to 
discuss the contradictory statements reflected in the police report and to advise Varela that he had 
"zero chance" of winning at a hearing on the license suspension. (R., Vol. II, p. 359, Tr. p. 205, 
LL. 18-26; R., Vol. II, p. 359, Tr. p. 206, LL. 1-6; R., Vol. II, p. 230, LL. 3-12.) 
Varela testified that Appellant did not call him or otherwise communicate with him on 
June 3, 2005 (R., Vol. II, p. 330, Tr. p. 91, LL. 19-21.) Appellant's billing statement did not 
reflect a telephone call to or from Varela or any other communication with Varela on June 3, 
2005. (R., Vol. II, p. 495; Exhibit 76, p. 5.) 
Appellant failed to submit a written request for a show cause hearing to the magistrate 
court by June 6, 2005. (R., Vol. II, p. 495.) 
On June 6, 2005, Varela called the Idaho Transportation Department ("lTD") to verifY the 
status of his driver's license. (R., Vol. II, p. 321, Tr. p. 53, LL. 2-7.) He was informed that his I 
request for a hearing had been sent to the lTD in error and that the request should have been filed 
with the magistrate court. (R., Vol. II, p. 321, Tr. p. 53, LL 2-19.) 
At hearing, Varela testified that he then called Appellant, who informed him that the 
show cause hearing request was properly submitted to the lTD and that, in any event, a hearing 
was irrelevant because Varela's case was without merit. (R., Vol. II, p. 321, Tr. p. 54, LL. 3-20; 
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R., Vol. II, p. 321, Tr. p. 55, LL. 6-16.) On that day, Varela reiterated to Appellant that he 
wanted to request a show cause hearing. (R., Vol. II, p. 321, Tr. p. 55, LL. 17-25.) 
In his October 2005 response to Bar Counsel, Appellant stated that Varela came to his 
office the week of June 6, 2005, and was "desperate" to avoid the license suspension because he 
would lose his job. (R., Vol. II, p. 496; Exhibit 76, p. 3.) He acknowledged that his office had 
already submitted a hearing request to the lTD as a standard procedure. (R., Vol. II, p. 496; 
Exhibit 76, p. 3.) Appellant stated that he agreed to talk to Mr. Miller about withdrawing the 
suspension in exchange for a guilty plea to the DUI charge. (R., Vol. II, p. 497; Exhibit 76, p. 3.) 
He stated, however, that no such offer was made by Mr. Miller in Varela's case. (R., Vol. II, p. 
497; Exhibit 76, p. 3.) 
At hearing, Appellant acknowledged that he spoke with Varela about his case on June 6, 
2005. (R., Vol. II, p. 365, Tr. p. 230, LL. 10-14.) He testified that he informed Varela that he 
could still file the hearing request that day, but that Varela lacked grounds to challenge probable 
cause. (R., Vol. II, p. 360, Tr. p. 210, LL. 11-25; R., Vol. II, p. 360, Tr. p. 211, LL. 1-5.) He 
testified that Mr. Miller still had authority at that time to withdraw the license suspension in 
exchange for a guilty plea to the DUI charge. (R., Vol. II, p. 363, Tr. p. 221, LL. 12-21; R., Vol. 
II, p. 363, Tr. p. 222, LL. 19-22.) He testified that he informed Varela that he would talk to Mr. 
Miller and attempt to "cut a deal" because keeping the driver's license was important to Varela. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 363, Tr. p. 223, LL. 2-14.) Appellant testified that when he spoke with Mr. Miller 
within a few days of his discussion with Varela, Mr. Miller was not receptive to withdrawing the 
suspension in exchange for a DUI plea. (R., Vol. II, p. 363, Tr. p. 224, LL. 15-25.) Appellant 
also testified, however, that he never spoke with Mr. Miller at any time after June 6, 2005, about 
any plea offer. (R., Vol. II, p. 364, Tr. p. 226, LL. 3-6; R., Vol. II, p. 412, Tr. p. 292, LL. 2-9; R., 
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Vol. II, p. 412, Tr. p. 293, LL. 15-24.) He testified that although he told Varela that he would 
contact Mr. Miller about the plea offer, he did not do so because Varela had a better chance of 
obtaining a favorable plea deal the longer his case "languished." (R., Vol. II, p. 364, Tr. p. 226, 
LL. 3-19.) 
On June 10,2005, Appellant's assistant, Joni Vann, faxed a letter to the ITD requesting a 
show cause hearing on Varela's license suspension. (R., Vol. II, p. 497; Exhibit 86, pp. 2-5.) 
The letter, dated June 6, 2005, was signed by Appellant and set forth various grounds for the 
hearing. (R., Vol. II, p. 497; Exhibit 86, pp. 3-5.) In a notation on the fax cover page, Ms. Vann 
stated that Appellant's letter, which indicated it had been faxed to ITD on June 6, 2005, may be a 
"duplicate request." (R., Vol. II, p. 497; Exhibit 86, p. 2.) 
At hearing, Appellant testified that the ITD letter was a "form letter" that his staff was 
trained to send as a "stop gap" in all DUI cases. (R., Vol. II, p. 361, Tr. p. 213, LL. 18-26.) He 
testified that Ms. Vann signed his name on the letter, which he had not seen at any time prior to 
the hearing. (R., Vol. II, p. 361, Tr. p. 216, LL. 10-15; R., Vol. II, p. 368, Tr. p. 244, LL. 12-24; 
R., Vol. II, p. 369, Tr. p. 246, LL. 3-10.) He also testified that he did not sign or authorize the 
letter. (R., Vol. II, p. 369, Tr. p. 247, LL. 6-25.) During her testimony, Ms. Rembert identified 
the signature on the ITD letter as Appellant's signature. (R., Vol. II, p. 438, Tr. p. 399, LL. lO-
IS.) 
Also on June 10, 2005, Appellant faxed to Mr. Miller a copy of the letter he had written 
to lTD. (R., Vol. II, pp. 497-498; Exhibit 51.) On the fax cover sheet, Appellant stated that the 
attached letter requesting a hearing on Varela's license suspension was sent "in error to the Idaho 
Transportation Department on June 6." (R., Vol. II, p. 497; Exhibit 51.) Appellant asked 
whether Mr. Miller would object to a hearing even though Appellant had not timely requested a 
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show cause hearing with the magistrate court. (R., Vol. II, pp. 497-498; Exhibit 51.) Despite his 
admission to the contrary in his Answer, Appellant testified at hearing that Ms. Vann sent the 
June 10, 2005 letter to Mr. Miller without his knowledge or authorization. (R., Vol. II, p. 406, 
Tr. p. 269, LL. 13-17; R., Vol. II, p. 406, Tr. p. 270, LL. 14-25; R., Vol. II, p. 406, Tr. p. 271, LL. 
1-5.) 
On June 20, 2005, Mr. Miller responded to Appellant's request that he consent to a 
hearing. (R., Vol. II, p. 498; Exhibit 52.) Mr. Miller stated that "failure to properly present a 
request for a refusal hearing before the court results in the court losing jurisdiction over the 
matter." (R., Vol. II, p. 498; Exhibit 52.) Mr. Miller did not agree to waive the jurisdictional 
requirement. (R., Vol. II, p. 498; Exhibit 52.) 
At hearing, Appellant admitted that after he received Mr. Miller's June 20, 2005 letter, he 
did not initiate plea negotiations with Mr. Miller in an effort to have Varela's license suspension 
terminated. (R., Vol. II, p. 407, Tr. p. 272, LL. 10-13; R., Vol. II, p. 422, Tr. p. 333, LL. 1-13.) 
Shortly after June 20, 2005, Varela terminated Appellant's representation and retained 
Mr. Egusquiza. (R., Vol. II, p. 498.) On June 28, 2005, Mr. Egusquiza filed a Notice of 
Substitution of Attorney. (R., Vol. II, p. 498; Exhibit 58.) On July 6,2005, Mr. Egusquiza filed 
a Motion for Hearing ("Hearing Motion") in Elmore County requesting a hearing pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 18-8002, to determine whether Varela's license should be suspended for refusal to 
submit to an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration. (R., Vol. II, p. 498; Exhibit 59.) 
At the disciplinary hearing, Mr. Egusquiza testified that he filed the Hearing Motion in an 
effort to "realign" Varela's case after Appellant failed to file a timely hearing request with the 
magistrate court. (R., Vol. II, p. 340, Tr. p. 131, LL. 4-10.) He testified that if the magistrate 
court had granted the Hearing Motion, he planned to question the arresting officer about the 
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circumstances of Varela's arrest, including whether the officer or any witnesses actually observed 
Varela in actual physical control of the vehicle while under the influence. CR., Vol. II, p. 340, Tr. 
p. 130, LL. 11-23.) Contrary to Appellant's argument, Mr. Egusquiza testified that Varela would 
not have been required to testify as a witness if a show cause hearing on the license suspension 
had been conducted and he did not anticipate calling Varela as a witness. CR., Vol. II, p. 340, Tr. 
p. 132, LL. 24-36; R., Vol. II, p. 341, Tr. p. 133, LL. 1-15.) 
On July 19, 2005, Mr. Egusquiza sent Appellant a letter stating that Varela requested a 
refund of the $500 retainer fee based on "misgivings" about Appellant's handling of the criminal 
case. (R., Vol. II, p. 499; Exhibit 68.) 
On July 22, 2005, the magistrate court denied Mr. Egusquiza's motion for a show cause 
hearing on Varela's license suspension, because the hearing had not been requested by June 6, 
2005, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002. (R., Vol. II, p. 499; Exhibit 64.) The magistrate court 
also ordered the suspension of Varela's driver's license and all driving privileges for 180 days. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 499; Exhibit 64.) 
Also on July 22, 2005, Appellant sent Mr. Egusquiza a letter asking him to explain 
Varela's "misgivings" and why Varela would be entitled to a refund of a "non-refundable fee." 
(R., Vol. II, p. 499; Exhibit 69.) At hearing, Appellant testified that he never refused to return 
the unearned portion of his $500 fee. (R., Vol. II, p. 409, Tr. p. 282, LL. 14-18; R., Vol. II, p. 
418, Ir. p. 318, LL. 9-19.) 
On August 15,2005, Varela filed a grievance against Appellant. (Exhibit 70.) He stated 
that after ITD informed him that Appellant filed his hearing request with the wrong entity, he 
called Appellant and was informed that the hearing request was properly filed with ITD and that 
ITD would notify the magistrate court. (R., Vol. II, pp. 499-500; Exhibit 70, p. 2.) He asserted 
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that Appellant also told him at that time that he had no defense to the DUl charge and refusal and 
therefore he would not prevail at hearing. (R., Vol. II, p. 500; Exhibit 70, p. 2.) Varela stated 
that Appellant never informed him that the $500 fee was nonrefundable and denied that he signed 
a fee agreement. (R., Vol. II, p. 500; Exhibit 70, p. 2.) 
On August 29, 2005, Appellant received a letter from Bar Counsel's Office requesting a 
response to Varela's grievance. (R., Vol. II, p. 500; Exhibit 72.) 
On September 2,2005, Appellant wrote to Varela offering a $218.75 refund. (R., Vol. II, 
p. 500; Exhibit 73.) He informed Varela that he could pick up the refund check at his office. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 500; Exhibit 73.) 
On September 16, 2005, instead of mailing the refund check to Varela, Appellant wrote 
another letter asking him to schedule an appointment to pick up the refund check. (R., Vol. II, p. 
500; Exhibit 74.) At hearing, Appellant testified that he did not send the refund check to Varela 
because his office had three different addresses for Varela and he did not know where the refund 
check should be mailed. (R.,Vol.II,p.366,Tr. p. 234, LL. 8-12.) However, Appellant's 
September 2, 2005 and September 16, 2005 letters were sent to the same address Varela included 
with his grievance. (R., Vol. II, p. 500; Exhibits 73 and 74.) Appellant also testified that he did 
not send the refund to Mr. Egusquiza because he did not trust Mr. Egusquiza. (R., Vol. II, p. 
366, Tr. p. 234, LL. 13-16.) 
Varela did not reply to Appellant's September 2005 letters because he did not want to 
speak with Appellant or schedule an appointment to obtain the refund. (R., Vol. II, p. 325, Tr. p. 
69, LL. 3-8.) 
On October 11, 2005, Appellant submitted a letter to Bar Counsel responding to Varela's 
grievance. (Exhibit 76.) He enclosed with that response a proposed affidavit ("Affidavit") for 
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Varela's signature. (Exhibit 76, pp. 6-7.) Appellant stated in his letter to Bar Counsel that the 
Affidavit was being presented to Varela "for him to review and sign, which if he does might 
prevent him from being sued for libel and slander." (Exhibit 76, p. 1.) The Affidavit consisted 
of statements by Varela that Appellant had essentially not erred in his representation. (R., Vol. 
II, p. 501; Exhibit 76, pp. 6-7.) Appellant asked Bar Counsel to advise him immediately if 
Varela refused to sign the Affidavit so he could consider legal action. (R., Vol. II, p. 501; 
Exhibit 76, p. 3.) 
At hearing, Appellant testified that the Affidavit gave Varela an opportunity to correct the 
record and constituted a "threat" only if Varela failed to tell the truth. (R., Vol. II, p. 367, Tr. p. 
237, LL. 8-13; R., Vol. II, p. 408, Tr. p. 278, LL. 13-19.) Appellant acknowledged that he 
threatened to sue Varela if Varela refused to sign the Affidavit. (R., Vol. II, p. 410, Tr. p. 287, 
LL. 12-24.) Varela testified that Appellant's threat of a lawsuit "scared" him because he was 
only 18 years old and "didn't know how everything worked exactly." (R., Vol. II, p. 325, Tr. p. 
71, LL. 2-14.) 
Appellant's October 11,2005 response also included a billing statement for Varela's case 
that he stated he prepared himself. (R., Vol. II, p. 502; Exhibit 76, pp. 2, 5.) The statement 
reflected the following activity: (1) on Friday, June 3, 2005, Appellant reviewed discovery and 
prepared court documents; (2) on Saturday, June 4, 2005, he prepared a letter to ITD and called 
the magistrate court; and (3) on Sunday, June 5, 2005, he called Mr. Miller. (R., Vol. II, p. 502; 
Exhibit 76, p. 5.) At hearing, Appellant testified that, contrary to his statement to Bar Counsel 
that he prepared the billing statement himself, his staff prepared the billing statement with 
erroneous dates. (R., Vol. II, p. 370, Tr. p. 249, LL. 7-9.) He also testified that his calls to the 
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magistrate court and Mr. Miller would have been made on June 3, 2005 or June 6, 2005. (R., 
Vol. II, p. 370, Tr. p. 249, LL. 10-20.) 
Appellant also enclosed with his October 11, 2005 response a copy of a $218.75 refund 
check, which he stated was "written by [him] to Mateo Varela, dated June 5th, 2005." (R., Vol. 
II, p. 502; Exhibit 76, p. 4.) The amount of the refund check, dated June 5, 2005, reflected a 
$37.50 charge for a phone call from Varela on June 21, 2005, before a refund was requested but 
after the refund check was purportedly written. (R., Vol. II, p. 502; Exhibit 76, p. 4.) At hearing, 
when questioned about the date of the check, Appellant testified that his staff prepared the 
backdated check. (R., Vol. II, p. 433, Tr. p. 377, LL. 6-18.) 
On October 28, 2005, Varela submitted a reply to Appellant's response, stating that he 
would not have filed the grievance against Appellant if he thought it would "get [him] sued." 
(Exhibit 79, p. 2.) He further stated that the statements in the Affidavit that Appellant demanded 
he sign were not true. (Exhibit 79, p. 2.) 
On May 20, 2009, the ISB filed its Complaint. (R., Vol. I, pp. 2-15.) On July 22,2009, 
Appellant filed his Answer. (R., Vol. I, pp. 18-25.) 
On March 10, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint on the following 
grounds: (1) ISB's delay in filing the Complaint violated Appellant's due process rights; (2) 
Appellant complied with the LR.P.C. because Varela's request for a show cause hearing lacked 
"legal and factual merit"; (3) no evidence showed that Appellant made a material 
misrepresentation of fact; (4) no evidence showed that Appellant failed to adequately 
communicate with Varela or failed to return an unearned fee; and (5) no evidence showed that 
the proposed Affidavit was delivered to Varela or "violated legal or bar standards." (R., Vol. I, 
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pp. 47-131.) The ISB filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, under seal, on April 1, 2010. 
(R., Vol. I, pp. 135-152.) 
On April 8, 2010, the Committee held a telephonic hearing on Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss. (R., Supp. Vol., pp. 553-584.) On April 9, 2010, the Committee entered an Order 
denying that motion. (R., Vol. I, pp. 153-155.) 
In or around May 2010, Varela called Appellant and reiterated his request for a refund of 
unearned fees. (R., Vol. II, p. 325, Tr. p. 72, LL. 6-18.) Appellant sent Varela a refund check for 
$218.75. (R., Vol. II, p. 325, Tr. p. 72, LL. 6-8.) 
On December 2 and 3, 2010, the Committee conducted an evidentiary hearing. (R., Vol. 
II, pp. 307-489.) Varela and Mr. Egusquiza testified for the ISB. Appellant, Ms. Rembert and a 
private investigator, Chris Melgaard, testified for Appellant. At the close of that hearing, the 
Committee directed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R., 
Vol. II, p. 442, Tr. p. 412, LL. 18-21.) 
On January 18,2011, the ISB filed its Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & 
Recommendation. (R., Vol. II, pp. 257-294.) 
On January 20,2011, Appellant filed his Memorandum of Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R., Vol. II, pp. 295-306.) Appellant's Memorandum did not include any 
findings of fact and proposed the following conclusions of law: (1) Appellant's constitutional 
due process rights were violated by the ISB's delay in filing the Complaint; (2) Appellant was 
not required to pursue every defense Varela requested if that required filing a frivolous action; (3) 
Appellant communicated the basis of his fee through contemporaneous billing statements; (4) 
Appellant did not fail to return unearned fees because he sent a refund ch~xk directly to the ISB, 
which then failed to forward the check to Varela; and (5) Appellant's proposed Affidavit for 
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Varela's signature did not violate LR.P.C. 8.4(d) because the statements therein were not 
knowingly false. (R., Vol. II, pp. 295-304.) 
On April 7, 2011, the Committee issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation, finding that the ISB proved by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant 
violated I.R.P.C. 1.2, 1.3, 1.5(b), 1. 16(d) and 8.4(d). (R., Vol. II, pp. 490-526.) With respect to 
LR.P.C. 1.2 and 1.3, the Committee concluded that Appellant did not perform the services 
requested by Varela relating to the driver's license suspension, did not timely file a request for 
the show cause hearing with the proper venue and, when he filed the same request for a show 
cause hearing with the wrong agency, argued that the request for a hearing in the proper venue 
was frivolous. (R., Vol. II, pp. 512-513.) The Committee also concluded that Appellant failed to 
take any action to remedy the situation by properly requesting the show cause hearing or 
negotiating a plea agreement that might restore Varela's driver's license. (R., Vol. II, p. 513.) 
With respect to I.R.P.C. 1.5(b) and 1.16(d), the Committee concluded that Appellant did 
not enter into a written fee agreement with Varela, that he failed to promptly refund any advance 
payment of fee to Varela that had not been earned, and that Appellant knew, or should have 
known, that he was dealing improperly with client property. (R., Vol. II, pp. 513-514.) The 
Committee also concluded that Appellant initially rejected Varela's refund request, did not offer 
a refund until after Varela filed a grievance and did not provide the refund until five years after 
the representation was terminated. (R., Vol. II, p. 514.) 
Regarding I.R.P.C. 8.4( d), the Committee concluded that Appellant's threat to sue Varela 
for defamation based on the allegations presented in the disciplinary proceeding was without 
merit under I.B.C.R. 520 and constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. (R., 
Vol. II, pp. 510-511, 515-516.) The Committee concluded that Appellant knew he was 
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improperly interfering with the disciplinary proceeding by asking Varela to make statements in 
the proffered Affidavit that were not true and that Appellant proffered the Affidavit in an effort 
to improperly attempt to effect a dismissal of the disciplinary proceeding. (R., Vol. II, p. 516.) 
The Committee also concluded that Appellant knew he made false statements to the ISB in his 
response to Varela's grievance and that those statements were inconsistent with the admitted 
exhibits and Appellant's testimony at hearing. (R., Vol. II, p. 516.) 
In determining the appropriate sanction, the Committee considered the American Bar 
Association Standards for Imposing Lawyers Sanctions (amended 1992) ("ABA Standards"). 
(R., Vol. II, pp. 512-521.) The Committee considered ABA Standards 4.4, 4.42 and 4.43 in 
connection with Appellant's failure to pursue Varela's objectives and act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness and concluded that Appellant knowingly failed to perform services for 
Varela and caused injury to Varela. (R., Vol. II, pp. 512-513.) The Committee considered ABA 
Standards 4.1, 4.12 and 4.13 in connection with Appellant's failure to promptly refund unearned 
fees to Varela and concluded that Appellant knew or should have known that he was dealing 
improperly with Varela's property. (R., Vol. II, pp. 513-514.) The Committee considered ABA 
Standards 6.1, 6.12, 6.13, 6.2, 6.22 and 6.23 in connection with Appellant's proffering of the 
Affidavit for Varela's signature and his threat to sue Varela if he did not sign the Affidavit. (R., 
Vol. II, pp. 515-516.) The Committee concluded that Appellant knew he was improperly 
interfering with the disciplinary proceeding and proffered the Affidavit in an attempt to effect a 
dismissal of the disciplinary proceedings. (R., Vol. II, p. 516.) The Committee also concluded 
that Appellant knew he made false statements to Bar Counsel in response to its investigation of 
Varela's grievance. (R., Vol. II, p. 516.) 
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The Committee also considered ABA Standards 9.1, 9.21 and 9.22, concernmg 
aggravating factors, and concluded that Appellant had a significant prior disciplinary record; had 
a dishonest or selfish motive in connection with his handling of Varela's refund request; engaged 
in a pattern of misconduct; committed multiple offenses of the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct; engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding; refused to acknowledge 
the wrongful nature of his conduct; refused to acknowledge issues of fact that were not in dispute 
at hearing; represented a vulnerable client; had substantial experience in the practice of law; and 
showed indifference to making restitution to Varela. (R., Vol. II, pp. 516-517.) 
Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law and its analysis of the ABA 
Standards, the Committee recommended that Appellant be suspended from the practice of law in 
the State of Idaho for a period of three years, with 18 months of such suspension withheld, and 
that he be placed on probation for a period of three years following his reinstatement, if any, 
upon specified terms and conditions set forth in the recommendation. (R., Vol. II, pp. 522-524.) 
On April 28, 2011, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. (R., Vol. II, pp. 550-552.) 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the Idaho Supreme Court reviews an attorney discipline action, it independently 
examines the record developed before the Professional Conduct Board "to determine whether the 
evidence supports the findings and recommendation of the Board's hearing committee." Idaho 
State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86, 90,44 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2002); Idaho State Bar v. Frazier, 
136 Idaho 22, 25, 28 P.3d 363, 366 (2001); Idaho State Bar v. Souza, 142 Idaho 502, 505, 129 
P.3d 1251,1254 (2006). The Court will examine the hearing committee's decision, to determine 
if it is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. Idaho State Bar v. Warrick, 137 Idaho 86, 
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90,44 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2002); Idaho State Bar v. Gatenbein, 133 Idaho 316, 319,986 P.2d 339, 
342 (1999); Idaho State Bar v. Everard, 142 Idaho 109, 112, 124 P.3d 985, 988 (2005). The 
hearing committee's findings are entitled to great weight. Id. 
The disciplined attorney has the burden of showing the evidence does not support the 
hearing committee's findings and recommendations. Id, Idaho State Bar v. Malmin, 139 Idaho 
304,307,78 P.3d 371, 374 (2003). The Court independently reviews the record and assesses the 
evidence; nevertheless, the Court gives the hearing committee's findings of fact great weight. 
The ultimate responsibility for assessing the facts and ordering the sanctions to be imposed 
however rests with the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 307-308, 78 P.3d at 374-375 and Idaho State 
Bar v. Williams, 126 Idaho 839, 843, 893 P.2d 202,206 (1995). 
With respect to whether the Committee's recommendation is clearly erroneous or 
arbitrary and capricious, in Enterprise v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 739, 736 P.2d 729, 734 
(1975), this Court reasoned: 
For the City Council's actions to be deemed "arbitrary or capricious," it must be 
shown that its actions were done without rational basis; were in disregard of the 
facts and circumstances presented; or without adequate determining principles. 
Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when 
exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed 
that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. 
With respect to the clearly erroneous standard, since the findings and recommendation of 
the Committee are analogous to a district court's findings, Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 
332, 92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004), provides the following: 
This Court affirms a district court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
"clearly erroneous." I.R.C.P. 52(a). Findings "based upon substantial and 
competent, although conflicting, evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Bolger 
v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792,794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002) (citing DeChambeau v. 
Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P.2d 922, 925 (1999)). This Court 
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exercises free review over matters of law. Id. (citing Bouten Constr. Co. v. H F 
Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999)). 
Similarly, in Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497, 500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275, (Ct. App. 1989), the 
Court of Appeals noted: 
As to the "clearly erroneous" standard under Rule 52(a), clear error will not be 
deemed to exist if the court's findings are supported by substantial and competent, 
though conflicting, evidence. Rasmussen v. Martin, 104 Idaho 401,659 P.2d 155 
(Ct. App. 1983). Where evidence is conflicting, the task of weighing such 
evidence falls within the province of the trial court. Id. Finally, when a trial 
court's findings of fact are challenged on appeal, the appellant has the burden of 
showing error, and the reviewing court will review the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the respondent. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 
51 (1979); Salazar v. Tilly, supra. 
III. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellant has raised the following issues on appeal: 
A. Were the Appellant's due process rights violated by a delay in filing the Complaint? 
B. Were the Appellant's due process rights violated by the Committee's delay in issuing the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation? 
C. Was the Committee's decision that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 1.2 and 1.3, by failing to 
abide by his client's objectives and failing to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness, clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious? 
D. Was the Committee's decision that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 1.5(b), by failing to 
communicate the basis or rate of his fee, clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious? 
E. Was the Committee's decision that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 1. 16(d), by failing to 
return unearned fees upon termination of representation, clearly erroneous or arbitrary and 
capricious? 
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F. Was the Committee's decision that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 8.4(d), by engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, clearly erroneous or arbitrary and 
capricious? 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant has not satisfied his burden of showing that the evidence does not support the 
Committee's decision and that the Committee's decision is clearly erroneous or arbitrary and 
capricious. The Committee's determination that Appellant should be suspended for three years, 
with 18 months of such suspension withheld, has a rational basis and is consistent with the facts 
and circumstances presented to the Committee and consistent with the determining principles, 
i.e., the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Standards. The Committee's 
recommendation is based upon substantial and competent evidence. Moreover, the arguments 
offered by Appellant on appeal are not new, have already been argued and have been decided 
upon the clear and convincing evidence admitted and testimony presented at hearing. As a 
consequence, the Court should at least impose the sanction recommended by the Committee. 
A. Appellant's due process rights were not violated by delay in the disciplinary 
proceedings. 
Appellant argues that the ISB delayed filing formal disciplinary charges and that such 
delay violated his due process rights. Specifically, he contends that although he submitted his 
initial response to the ISB's investigation of the Varela grievance in October 2005, the Complaint 
was not filed until May 2009, and the evidentiary hearing was not held until December 2010. 
Appellant first raised this due process argument in his Motion to Dismiss, which the Committee 
denied. At hearing on that motion, Appellant failed to provide any proof that a delay in these 
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proceedings violated his due process rights. His reiteration of the due process argument on 
appeal, without any supporting evidence, is equally without merit. 
In January 2008, Appellant closed his law practice. (R., Vol. I, p. 50.) On February 1, 
2010, he transferred his license to affiliate status, meaning he was no longer licensed to practice 
law in Idaho. On March 3, 2011, his license was transferred to inactive status for nonpayment. 
Based on the I.B.C.R. and his disciplinary history with the ISB, Appellant knew at the time he 
discontinued his law practice and transferred to affiliate status that the Varela grievance had not 
been resolved. He also knew that, in addition to Varela's grievance, the ISB was investigating 
five other grievances filed against Appellant between October 2003 and January 2007. An 
additional grievance, which formed the basis for Count One of the Complaint, was filed with the 
ISB in March 2008. 
The ISB was investigating all of the grievances filed against Appellant to determine 
which, if any, merited formal charges. Consistent with the ISB's standard practice, those 
grievances were investigated separately, but also together as a group to determine if the 
grievances alleged or presented a pattern of professional misconduct, before making a final 
determination of how those grievances were resolved and whether formal charges would be filed 
on one or more gnevances. 
In this instance, four grievances were concluded with private reprimands issued in August 
and September 2008, and one grievance was dismissed by letter in August 2008. (R., Vol. II, pp. 
504-507; Exhibits 81-84.) Formal charges were instituted on Varela's grievance and the March 
2008 grievance filed with the ISB by Brenda Wright. The timing of those grievances, coupled 
with the ISB's practice of evaluating multiple grievances filed against the same attorney, 
demonstrate there was no effort to gain an unfair tactical advantage in this case. Appellant knew 
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the disciplinary matters would be resolved upon issuance by Bar Counsel of a disposition or, 
alternatively, the filing of a formal charge complaint. He acknowledged that he did not receive 
any communication from the ISB indicating the Varela disciplinary matter was closed. (R., Vol. 
I, pp. 49-50.) Therefore, his argument that he believed the Varela matter had been concluded 
before the Complaint was filed is inconsistent with the record. 
Contrary to Appellant's argument, the disciplinary proceeding was not precluded due to 
the length of Bar Counsel's investigation or the timing of the Complaint. I.B.C.R. 525(h) 
specifically provides that the time between an attorney's misconduct and the filing of a grievance 
"may be pertinent to whether and to what extent a Sanction should be imposed, but does not limit 
Bar Counsel's power to investigate and prosecute." Therefore, the delay between Appellant's 
misconduct and the filing of the Complaint does not preclude formal disciplinary action but may 
be, and was, considered as a mitigating factor for sanction purposes. See ABA Standards, 
Standard 9.320); Florida Bar v. Micks, 628 So.2d 1104, 1107 (Fla.1993) (extended delay in 
filing disciplinary action may be considered in determining sanction); Rhodes v. California State 
Bar, 775 P.2d 1035, 1045 (Ca.1989) (delay may be a mitigating factor); In re Morrow, 734 P.2d 
867,869 (Or. 1987) (significant delay is relevant for sanction). 
This Court addressed the issue of delay in disciplinary proceedings in Idaho State Bar v. 
Everard, 142 Idaho 109, 124 P.3d 985 (2005). In Everard, an attorney who was the subject of 
reciprocal disciplinary proceedings contended that he was denied due process because the ISB 
commenced reciprocal disciplinary proceedings approximately 18 months after he first advised 
the ISB of a disciplinary order entered against him in Washington. The attorney argued that the 
delay denied him due process because he could not transfer his Idaho license from inactive to 
active status until the Idaho reciprocal disciplinary proceedings concluded. In denying the 
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attorney's due process claim, this Court cited United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), 
which requires a showing that a prosecutor delayed bringing criminal charges in a deliberate 
attempt to gain an unfair tactical advantage or in reckless disregard of the probable prejudicial 
impact of the delay upon a defendant's ability to defend against the charges. Id. at 116, 124 P .3d 
at 992. In Everard, the Court found that the attorney failed to show that the ISB "in any way 
hindered [his] ability to defend these proceedings or deprived him of due process." Id. 
Other courts have similarly found that prosecution of professional misconduct is proper 
despite an alleged delay in disciplinary proceedings. As explained by the Oregon Supreme 
Court: 
[T]he primary purpose of professional disciplinary proceedings is to protect the 
public. The punishment of an offending member of the profession is indeed a 
serious matter, but it is incidental to the protection of the public. If the conduct of 
a member of the Bar disqualifies him from the practice of law, it would not be in 
the public interest to dismiss the disciplinary proceedings for no reason other than 
the Bar's failure to prosecute them with the proper dispatch. 
In re Weinstein, 459 P.2d 548,549 (Or. 1969). See also, In re Geisler, 614 N.E.2d 939,940 (Ind. 
1993) (no statute of limitations exists for disciplinary proceedings and mere delay does not 
preclude such proceedings); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Goldsborough, 624 A.2d 503, 510 
(Md. 1993) (laches defense inapplicable in disciplinary proceeding because primary purpose is 
protection of the public); Florida Bar v. Micks, 628 So.2d 1104, 1107 (Fla.1993) (extended delay 
in filing disciplinary action does not exonerate attorney); Attorney Grievance Comm 'n v. 
Owrutsky, 587 A.2d 511, 513 (Md.l991 ) (disciplinary proceeding not barred despite four-year 
delay); Rhodes v. California State Bar, 775 P.2d 1035, 1045 (Ca.1989) (two-year delay is not a 
defense to disciplinary proceeding); In re Eisenberg, 423 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Wis.1988) (doctrine 
of laches does not bar disciplinary proceeding); In re Morrow, 734 P.2d 867, 869 (Or. 1987) 
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(significant delay between conduct and charges IS "not a defense but bears on the proper 
sanction"). 
Like Everard, Appellant has failed to show that a delay in these proceedings hindered his 
ability to defend himself or deprived him of due process. Appellant did not provide any proof 
that the ISB deliberately delayed filing the Complaint in order to gain an unfair tactical advantage 
or in reckless disregard of the prejudicial impact upon Appellant's ability to defend himself. 
Appellant also fails to provide any proof that he was prejudiced by the delay. He was aware the 
ISB was investigating the grievances filed against him and that the Varela and Wright matters 
had not been resolved before the Complaint was filed in May 2009. In the meantime, Appellant 
closed his law practice and transferred his license to affiliate status. His inability to practice law 
was his own choice and was not impacted by any delay in these disciplinary proceedings. 
The ISB did not delay these proceedings, deliberately or otherwise, in order to gain an 
unfair tactical advantage or in reckless disregard of the impact upon Appellant's ability to defend 
himself. Moreover, Appellant was not prejudiced by any delay. Accordingly, his due process 
argument fails. 
B. The Committee did not violate Appellant's due process rights by issuing its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation on April 7,2011. 
Appellant argues that the Committee violated his due process rights by entering its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation approximately four months after the 
hearing concluded and over two months after the parties submitted their proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Committee. Appellant argues the Committee "egregiously 
violated the Mandatory [sic] language of the [I.B.C.R] requiring the submission of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law within a Mandatory Period of Time." 
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Appellant cites I.B.C.R. 509(d)(6) as support for his argument. However, that rule does 
not apply to this formal charge proceeding, which is governed by I.B.C.R. 511 (h)(l). I.B.C.R. 
511 (h)(l) states that the Committee shall send its findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
recommendation to the Clerk within 28 days following the conclusion of the hearing. However, 
I.B.C.R. 525(i) specifically states that, unless otherwise provided, "the time in which any act or 
any thing is to be done or performed is not jurisdictional." Therefore, contrary to Appellant's 
argument, the timeline for the Committee to enter its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation was not jurisdictional, the time line was not "mandatory" and the Committee 
did not "egregiously violate" I.B.C.R. 511 by issuing its decision more than 28 days after the 
hearing concluded. 
Moreover, at hearing, Appellant's counsel agreed to submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by January 17, 2011, or 45 days after the hearing concluded and beyond the 
28-day timeline he now apparently argues is mandatory. (R., Vol. II, p. 442, Tr. p. 412, LL. 6-
21.) The Committee indicated its target for issuing findings of fact and conclusions oflaw was 
February 14,2011. (R., Vol. II, p. 442, Tr. p. 413, LL. 6-7.) Although Appellant now seeks to 
argue that the Committee violated his due process rights, the parties stipulated that the decision 
would be issued later than the timeline set forth in I.B.C.R. 511. (R., Vol. II, p. 442, Tr. p. 413, 
LL. 6-12.) 
Appellant does not argue or provide any proof that the Committee's issuance of its 
decision on April 7, 2011, prejudiced his interests. He has not been licensed to practice law in 
Idaho since February 2010, when he transferred his license to affiliate status. His license was 
transferred to inactive status in March 2011 because he failed to pay his annual dues. Therefore, 
the Committee's issuance of its decision in April 2001, rather than February 2011, did not affect 
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Appellant's ability to practice law and he has provided no proof of any prejudice in other 
respects. 
The timeline set forth in I.B.C.R. 511 is not jurisdictional and, in any event, Appellant 
agreed to the extension of that timeline at hearing. The timing of the Committee's decision did 
not cause any prejudice. Accordingly, Appellant's due process argument fails and the Court 
should impose the sanction recommended by the Committee based on the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law issued April 7, 2011. 
e. The Committee's decision that Appellant violated 1.R.P.e. 1.2 and 1.3 is not clearly 
erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
Appellant argues that the Committee's finding that he violated I.R.P.C. 1.2 and 1.3, by 
failing to timely file Varela's request for a hearing on the license suspension with the Elmore 
County magistrate court, was erroneous because such a filing would have been "blatantly 
frivolous" under I.R.P.C. 3.1. Appellant contends that Varela's testimony and the Affidavit of 
Probable Cause for Arrest demonstrated that the arresting officer had sufficient probable cause 
and, therefore, Appellant would have violated I.R.P.C. 3.1 by filing a hearing request to contest 
probable cause. Appellant first raised this issue in support of his Motion to Dismiss. The 
Committee denied that motion after hearing and also denied Appellant's contention following the 
evidentiary hearing. 
As a preliminary matter, the hearing was not a probable cause hearing but instead a 
hearing to show cause why Varela refused to submit to the breathalyzer test and why his license 
should not be suspended. Appellant's argument that filing the hearing request with the proper 
entity, the magistrate court, would have been frivolous is inconsistent with his actions in Varela's 
case. Appellant filed Varela's request for a show cause hearing with the lTD, yet now argues 
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that his failure to timely file the request with the proper entity would have been frivolous. 
Appellant's argument is inconsistent with his conduct in Varela's case. The record shows, and 
Appellant admitted, that Varela requested a show cause hearing and that Appellant failed to 
timely request that hearing. If, as Appellant now argues, he determined that Varela's request for 
a show cause hearing was frivolous, he would not have filed the same request with the wrong 
entity. Ifhe determined that such a request was prohibited under LR.P.C. 3.1, he also would not 
have contacted Mr. Miller to request that the jurisdictional requirement be waived so the hearing 
could be held notwithstanding Appellant's failure to timely file the hearing request with the 
magistrate court. (Exhibit 51.) 
Moreover, the record supports the Committee's conclusion that the show cause hearing 
request was not frivolous and that Appellant would not have been required to withdraw from the 
case had he abided by Varela's objectives. Mr. Egusquiza testified at hearing that Varela would 
not have been required to perjure himself to contest the license suspension. (R., Vol. II, p. 340, 
Tr. p. 132, LL. 24-36; R., Vol. II, p. 341, Tr. p. 133, LL. 1-15.) Mr. Egusquiza also testified that 
Varela had a non-frivolous basis to request a show cause hearing because Varela was not seen 
driving the vehicle in question on the night of his arrest. (R., Vol. II, p. 340, Tr. p. 131, LL. 11-
23; R., Vol. II, p. 340, Tr. p. 132, LL. 10-23.) 
The Committee rejected Appellant's argument that he did not timely file the hearing 
request with the proper entity because doing so would have required him to file a frivolous action 
in violation of LR.P. C. 3.1. Instead, the Committee concluded that the ISB proved, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that Appellant violated LR.P.C. 1.2, by failing to "perform services 
requested by Mr. Varela relating to the suspension of his license related to the refusal to submit 
to the breathalyzer examination." (R., Vol. II, pp. 511-513.) The Committee also concluded that 
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the ISB proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 1.3, by filing 
Varela's show cause hearing request with the "wrong agency," failing to timely file that request 
with the Elmore County magistrate court as required under I.e. § 18-8002, and doing "nothing to 
remedy the situation" which "resulted in injury" to Varela. (R., Vol. II, pp. 511-513.) The 
Committee's decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence, including testimony 
at hearing, and was not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, this Court 
should also hold that Appellant violated I.R.P. C. 1.2 and 1.3, with respect to Count Two of the 
Complaint, and impose the recommended sanction. (R., Vol. II, pp. 511-513, 522-524.) 
D. The Committee's decision that Appellant violated 1.R.P.e. l.S(b) was not clearly 
erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
Appellant argues that the Committee's finding that he violated I.R.P.C. 1.5(b), by failing 
to communicate the basis or rate of his fee to Varela, was clearly erroneous or arbitrary and 
capricious. Appellant contends that Varela testified that Appellant advised him of the $500 "flat 
fee" and argues that the fee was communicated through contemporaneous billing statements 
provided to the ISB in October 2005. 
Contrary to Appellant's argument, Varela did not testify that he was aware of the basis or 
rate of Appellant's fee. Instead, Varela testified that Appellant informed him only that he 
required a $500 "retaining fee" for representation in the DUI case and license suspension matter. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 320, Tr. p. 49, LL. 13-24.) He also testified that he did not understand that 
Appellant's fee was a nonrefundable fixed fee, as Appellant later claimed when Varela requested 
a refund upon termination of the representation. (R., Vol. II, p. 320, Tr. p. 50, LL. 5-13; Exhibit 
69.) 
Respondent's Brief - 33 
At hearing, Appellant testified that Varela signed a fee agreement stating that the $500 
fee was nonrefundable and that his office would have included the signed fee agreement in the 
file provided to Mr. Egusquiza. (R., Vol. II, p. 409, Ir. p. 283, LL. 5-12; R., Vol. II, p. 362, Ir. 
p. 219, LL. 3-15.) He also testified that his staff prepared all of his fee agreements for clients. 
(R., Vol. II, p. 362, Ir. p. 218, LL. 10-19.) However, his testimony was contradicted by Varela, 
Mr. Egusquiza, and Appellant's former assistant, Ms. Rembert. Varela testified that he was not 
presented with, and did not sign, a fee agreement for Appellant's services. (R., Vol. II, p. 331, 
Ir. p. 96, LL. 10-24; R., Vol. II, p. 332, Ir. p 97, LL. 11-19; R., Vol. II, p. 334, Ir. p. 107, LL. 2-
24.) Mr. Egusquiza testified that the file he received from Appellant did not include a fee 
agreement. (R., Vol. II, p. 440, Ir. p. 407, LL. 3-12.) Ms. Rembert testified that Appellant, not 
his staff, prepared all fee agreements for clients. (R., Vol. II, p. 439, Ir. p. 402, LL. 24-25; R., 
Vol. II, p. 439, Ir. p. 403, LL. 1-4.) Appellant never produced a written fee agreement. 
Moreover, his offer to refund unearned fees was inconsistent with his statements that the fee was 
nonrefundable under a written fee agreement. 
Based on that testimony and the lack of any record of the purported fee agreement, the 
Committee concluded that the ISB proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Appellant "did 
not enter into a written fee agreement" with Varela and that he violated LR.P.C. 1.5(b), by failing 
to communicate the basis or rate of his fee. (R., Vol. II, pp. 511, 513-514.) Ihe Committee's 
conclusion was supported by substantial and competent, though perhaps conflicting, evidence 
and was not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, this Court should also 
hold that Appellant violated LR.P.C. 1.5(b), with respect to Count Four of the Complaint, and 
impose the recommended sanction. (R., Vol. II, pp. 511, 522-524.) 
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E. The Committee's decision that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 1.16(d) was not clearly 
erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
Appellant argues that the Committee's determination that he violated LR.P.C. 1. 16(d), by 
failing to return an advance payment of fee that was not earned, was clearly erroneous or 
arbitrary and capricious. Appellant contends that he "made a direct and timely attempt to return" 
the unearned fees to Varela and asserts that he sent the ISB a partial refund check, which he had 
assumed would be forwarded to Varela. 
The Committee correctly concluded that Appellant did not make a timely attempt to 
return unearned fees as required under LR.P.C. 1. 16(d), either directly or through the ISB. (R., 
Vol. II, p. 514.) Contrary to Appellant's assertions, he did not send an original check to the ISB 
to be forwarded to Varela. His October 7, 2005 response attached only a copy of a purported 
refund check payable to Varela. (Exhibit 76, p. 4.) Appellant has provided no proof, such as a 
check register or canceled check, to support his repeated assertion that he sent Varela's refund 
check, and not a photocopy thereof, to the ISB. Moreover, the copy of the refund check that 
Appellant provided to the ISB raises significant questions about its authenticity. That check was 
dated June 5, 2005, approximately one week after Varela retained Appellant and prior to 
termination of the representation. (R., Vol. II, p. 502; Exhibit 76, p. 4.) In other words, 
Appellant provided a copy of a check purportedly issued before he could have known a refund 
would be requested. His accompanying invoice also reflected a charge for services rendered after 
the June 5, 2005 date of the check. (Exhibit 76, p. 5.) 
Appellant also did not timely provide a refund of unearned fees to Varela directly. The 
record confirms that on July 19,2005, Mr. Egusquiza wrote Appellant and requested a refund of 
Varela's retainer fee payment. (R., Vol. I, p. 38; Exhibit 68.) In his July 22,2005 reply to that 
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request, Appellant did not offer a refund. (Exhibit 69.) Instead, he asked Mr. Egusquiza to 
explain why Varela would be entitled to a refund of a "non-refundable fee." (Exhibit 69.) 
However, on September 2,2005, after Varela filed the grievance, Appellant sent Varela a 
letter advising him to come to his office to pick up a partial refund. (Exhibit 73.) Appellant did 
not mail the refund check with that letter. Two weeks later, instead of mailing the refund check 
to Varela, Appellant sent Varela another letter asking him to schedule an appointment to pick up 
the refund at his office. (R., Vol. II, p. 500; Exhibit 74.) Under LR.P.C. 1. 16(d), Varela was not 
required to visit Appellant's office to obtain the refund and he declined to do so. At hearing, 
Varela explained that he did not go to Appellant's office to obtain the refund because, "[w]ith 
everything that [Appellant] put [him] through, [he] didn't really want to see him." (R., Vol. II, p. 
325, Tr. p. 69, LL. 3-8.) 
Approximately five years later, in May 2010, Varela called Appellant and reiterated his 
request for a refund of unearned fees. (R., Vol. II, p. 325, Tr. p. 72, LL. 10-19.) Appellant then 
sent Varela a refund check for $218.75. (R., Vol. II, p. 325, Tr. p. 72, LL. 6-8.) 
The Committee concluded that the ISB proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
Appellant violated LR.P.C. 1. 16(d), by failing to "promptly refund any advance payment of fees 
to Mr. Varela that had not been earned," "dealing improperly with client property" and rejecting 
Varela's request for a refund of unearned fees "until after Mr. Varela filed a grievance with Bar 
Counsel's Office." (R., Vol. II, pp. 511, 513-514.) The Committee also recommended that 
Appellant be required to pay Varela an additional $109.37, reflecting the interest accrued in the 
five years between Varela's refund request and Appellant's partial refund. (R., Vol. II, p. 524.) 
The Committee's determination was supported by substantial and competent evidence and was 
not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, this Court should also hold that 
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Appellant violated LR.P.C. 1. 16(d), with respect to Count Four of the Complaint, and impose the 
recommended sanction. (R., Vol. II, p. 511, 522-524.) 
F. The Committee's decision that Appellant violated I.R.P.C. 8.4(d) was not clearly 
erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. 
Appellant argues that the Committee's decision that he violated LR.P.C. 8.4(d), by 
threatening to sue Varela if he failed to sign an Affidavit recanting the allegations of professional 
misconduct, was clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious and violated his rights under the 
First Amendment. 
Appellant's argument fails for several reasons. First, Appellant's alleged purpose in 
supplying the Affidavit, i.e., to avoid civil litigation, is not a defense. Under LB.C.R. 520, all 
grievances, complaints, testimony and other presentation or arguments submitted to Bar Counsel 
"shall be absolutely privileged, and no civil litigation predicated thereon may be instituted or 
maintained." Therefore, Appellant's threat to sue Varela for defamation based on the allegations 
presented to Bar Counsel was without merit and, if filed, may have constituted additional 
grounds for sanctions. See, e.g., In re Spikes (881 A.2d 1118 (D.C. 2005) (attorney suspended 
for 30 days based on violations of Rules 3.1 and 8.4( d) after attorney filed frivolous defamation 
claim based on privileged communication to Bar Counsel); In re Lupo, 851 N.E. 2d 404 (Mass. 
2006) (attorney filed frivolous lawsuit against another attorney who filed disciplinary grievance); 
Florida Bar v. Kelly, 813 So.2d 85 (Fla. 2002) (lawyer disciplined for filing frivolous lawsuit 
against former client based on grievance). 
Second, Appellant's argument that he did not violate I.R.P.C. 8.4(d) because he sent the 
proposed Affidavit to Bar Counsel, and not directly to Varela, is not supported by the record. 
Appellant sent the Affidavit to Bar Counsel in direct response to Varela's grievance and asked 
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Bar Counsel to advise him immediately if Varela refused to sign the Affidavit so he could 
consider legal action. (Exhibit 76, pp. 1-3, 6-8.) Appellant clearly requested that the Affidavit 
be sent to Varela in an effort to pressure him to disavow his earlier statements to Bar Counsel 
about Appellant's professional misconduct. Appellant knew his response would be provided to 
Varela for reply as is standard in disciplinary investigations. Appellant cannot now argue that 
providing the Affidavit to Varela, through Bar Counsel, renders LR.P.C. 8.4(d) inapplicable. 
Third, the Affidavit prepared by Appellant for Varela's signature would have required 
Varela to recant the allegations of professional misconduct which Varela stated in his grievance 
and which formed the basis for Counts Two through Four of the Complaint. Appellant now 
contends that the Affidavit was simply a demand letter sent in an effort to avoid a defamation 
lawsuit. However, the Affidavit was sent in direct response to Varela's grievance and was 
clearly intended to pressure Varela to participate in the possible dismissal of his grievance or risk 
separate legal action. 
At hearing, Appellant acknowledged that the Affidavit constituted a "threat in the sense 
that [Varela] should tell the truth." (R., Vol. II, p. 408, Tr. p. 278, LL. 13-19.) He also 
acknowledged that he threatened to sue Varela if Varela refused to sign the Affidavit. (R., Vol. 
II, p. 410, Tr. p. 287, LL. 12-24.) Varela clearly understood that he had been threatened based 
upon his filing of the grievance against Appellant. (R., Vol. II, p. 325, Tr. p. 71, LL. 2-14.) 
The ISB does not allege that LR.P.C. 8.4(d) prohibits attorneys from sending prelitigation 
demand letters in an effort to settle potential civil litigation. However, LR.P.C. 8.4(d) does 
prohibit attorneys who are the subject of disciplinary proceedings from threatening grievants to 
discredit their prior statements to Bar Counsel in an effort to effect a dismissal of those 
proceedings. See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 810 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1991). In Bennett, the attorney 
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and grievant reached a settlement agreement resolving many of the allegations underlying the 
disciplinary charges. Thereafter, the attorney requested that the grievant execute an "addendum 
agreement," pursuant to which the grievant would withdraw his disciplinary complaint and 
inform disciplinary counsel that no attorney-client relationship existed and he did not question 
the attorney's professional ethics. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the attorney's 
request for withdrawal of the grievance was prejudicial to the administration of justice and 
specifically noted that the addendum agreement would have required the grievant to "make 
factual and legal representations to the grievance committee with which [the grievant] did not 
agree." Bennett, 810 P .2d at 666. 
Here, like Bennett, Appellant attempted to persuade Varela to recant his allegations and 
withdraw his grievance by providing the Affidavit and threatening a defamation action. The 
Committee correctly concluded that the ISB proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
Appellant violated LR.P.C. 8.4(d), by threatening to file a lawsuit "without merit" against Varela, 
"improperly interfering with this disciplinary proceeding by asking Mr. Varela. to make 
statements in the proffered Affidavit that were not true" and proffering the Affidavit in an "effort 
to improperly effect a dismissal of the disciplinary proceeding." (R., Vol. II, pp. 511, 515-516.) 
The Committee also correctly concluded that Appellant "knew he made false statements to Bar 
Counsel in response to the investigation of Mr. Varela's grievance" in violation of I.R.P.C. 
8.4( d). (R., Vol. II, p. 516.) The Committee's determination that Appellant engaged in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice under LR.P.C. 8.4(d), was supported by substantial 
and competent evidence and was not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, 
this Court should also hold that Appellant violated LR.P.C. 8.4( d), with respect to Count Five of 
the Complaint, and impose the recommended sanction. (R., Vol. II, pp. 511, 522-524.) 
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v. 
CONCLUSION 
The Committee's recommendation is based upon clear, convincing, substantial and 
competent evidence. Appellant is unable to satisfY the burden of showing that the evidence does 
not support the Committee's findings and recommendation and that the recommendation is 
clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. The Committee's recommended sanction, 
including the requirement that Appellant reimburse the ISB $6,031.52 for its costs in this 
proceeding, is appropriate and the Court should issue a disciplinary order consistent therewith. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 t:t-day of December 2011. 
Bm0:tAn16~ 
Bar Counsel 
Respondent's Brief - 40 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on the ~day of December 2011, I served two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF upon the following by U.S. mail addressed and 
directed as follows: 
Larry D. Purviance 
5920 N. Government Rd., Ste. #4 
Dalton Gardens, ID 83815 
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